The answer to ten objections to a stateless society 
of
RD Long Translation
Maurizio Colucci (with the participation of Luigi Corvaglia, translator of Section 5 and responsible for change - target only to the 'euphony "and certainly not written in the improved semantic - of some parts of the earlier work of Colucci). Notes M. Colucci.
The English original is available here
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I want to speak of the main objections that were raised libertarian anarchism and groped to answer. But first ... I would like to briefly explain a positive reason in favor of a libertarian society.
Abstract: problems of monopoly forced
Look at it from that point of view: what's wrong with a monopoly of your shoes? Suppose that I and my band are the only ones with legal permission to produce and sell shoes. What's wrong? Well, first of all, from the moral point of view, the question is: why us? What we special? ... Why me and my band we have the right to produce and sell something that nobody else has the right to produce and sell, provide a good or service that no one else has the right to provide? As you know there are only a mortal, another human being like you. So from the point of view I have no moral right to do it more than anyone else. Then, of course, from a pragmatic point of view and consequentialist, what is the likely result of the fact that I and my band have a monopoly of your shoes? First of all, there are incentive problems. If I am the only person who has the right to make and sell shoes, I probably will not get the shoes at a good price. Can I make you pay what you want, at least until the price is not that we can not afford, or you decide that you are happier without shoes. But in any case I will ask the highest price I can get away from you - because you have no place else to turn. Also you probably should not expect that My shoes have a particularly high quality, because, after all, until the shoes are just decent, and as long as the favorites to go barefoot, you have to buy them from me. Besides the fact that probably my shoes will be very expensive and not great quality, because they are the only person who can produce and sell shoes gives me a certain power over you. Suppose you're annoying me. Suppose that I have offended you in some way. Well, maybe you need to go for a while 'around without shoes. Then there are also problems of abuse of power. But it is not just a problem of incentive. [There are also information problems.] In fact, suppose that I am a saint and do it for you the best shoes that I can to do, and that makes you pay the lowest price I can, and do not abuse all of my power. Suppose further that I am completely trustworthy. ... there is still a problem, namely: how do I know I'm doing a good job with these shoes? After all, I have no competitors. Maybe I could do polls to try to discover what kind of shoes people want. But there are many different ways I could make shoes. Some ways are more expensive than others. How do I know, without a market, and therefore without the information I derived from the profit or loss? I have to guess. So even if I do my best, the amount of shoes they produce and their quality may not be best suited to meet the preferences of individuals. And I have trouble to find out.
The government has a monopoly forced
So these are the reasons for not having a monopoly of production and forced the sale of shoes. At first glance, these seem also good reasons not to give anyone a monopoly on legal services, protection services, and all those things that we might call "the business of law." First there is the moral question: why a gang of people have the right to be the only one in a given territory to offer certain types of legal services and enforcement certain things? And then there are the economic questions: what are the incentives? This is also a monopoly. It seems likely that, as customers have to contact them, they will pay higher prices than they would otherwise, and will offer a lower quality. There may also be the occasional abuse of power. And then, even if you can avoid all these problems, and you can to get the government of the saints, there is always the problem of information: how do they know that the way in which they are providing legal services (the particular combination of services lawyers who are providing) is really the best? Since there is no competition, there is no way for them to know if they could do better. The purpose of these considerations is to move the burden of proof sull'interlocutore. At this point, the one who is opposed to competition in services, protection and arbitration must produce objections.
TEN OBJECTIONS Anarchism LIBERTARIAN 1. the government has a monopoly on coercive 
objection that is sometimes raised is not so much an objection to anarchism as an objection to moral argument in favor of anarchism. The claim says, look, the state is not really a monopoly of coercion. It is true that people have not given their consent. There is a sense in which people have consented to the existing system: deciding to live within the confines of a certain territory, by accepting the benefits the government offers, and so on. Just like if you go into a restaurant and you sit down and say you want a steak, you do not explicitly say that you're willing to pay, is something implied. By the act of sitting in a restaurant and ask for the steak, you are agreeing to pay. Similarly, according to this argument, if you sit in the territory of a State, and accept the benefit of police protection or something, then you have implicitly agreed to abide by its requirements. Note that even if this argument were correct, would not address the pragmatic question whether the State is the best system from the point of view of funzionamento.Ma think there are already problems in the topic in question. It is certainly true that, if within the property of others, there seems to be a kind of expectation on their property as long as I am, I have to do as they say. I have to follow their rules. If you do not want to follow their rules, then I have to go. For example, I invite you to my house, and when you come, I say "you have to wear this funny hat." And you say "why?" and I say "Well, that's how it works at my house. Everyone must wear the funny hat. They are my rules.". Well, in this case you can not say "I do not wear the funny hat but I am still here." These are my rules, may be silly, but I can do it. Now, suppose you feel at home and having dinner. I am your neighbor. I come and knock on your door. You open the door, I will later say, "You have to wear the funny hat." And you say: "Why?". And I say, "Well, did you live near me, no? Doing so, you have consented." And you say, "Wait a second! When I agreed to such a thing?" I think the person who holds that argument is already assuming that the government has some legitimate jurisdiction over this territory. And then they say now, anyone in the territory are agreeing to the rules prevailing. But they are taking what they need to prove, that this jurisdiction over the territory is legitimate. If not, then the government is just a group of people as another resident in this vast territory. But I have my property, which is not their (or at least I was not given any argument that suggests that they should). So the fact that I'm living in "this country" only means that I am living in a geographic region on which their camp some claims. But the question is whether these claims are legitimate. You can not take it as you try to provarlo.Un 'else: one of the problems of these arguments of the "implicit social contract" is that it is not clear what the contract. In the event that orders food at the restaurant, everyone knows pretty well what is the contract. So in this case you can set a topic on implied consent. But no one would suggest that you can buy a house in the same way. There are so many rules. When it is a complicated thing, no one would say "you have given your consent when you moved your head slightly to a point" or something like that. You have to find out what's really in the contract. What are you agreeing? If anyone knows what are the details of the contract is not an argument persuasivo.Ok, from this point on most of the subjects I will be pragmatic, or a mixture of moral and pragmatic.
2. Hobbes: the government is necessary for cooperation
Probably the most famous argument against anarchy is that of Hobbes. Hobbes's argument is: you see, human cooperation, social cooperation, requires a legal structure below. The reason why we can trust each other is that we know that there are forces and conditions that they will punish us if we violate the rights of others. I know that they will punish me if it violates your rights, but also punish you if you violate mine. So I can trust you without worrying about your personality. I just have to trust that you will be intimidated by the law. Thus, social cooperation requires this legal framework held together physical strength of the state. Well, here Hobbes is assuming a lot 'of things at the same time. First, is assuming that there can be no social cooperation without the law. Second, is the assumption that there can be no law if there is behind a physical force that ensures the application. Third, is assuming that only a state monopoly to enforce the law with force. But all these assumptions are false. First, it is certainly true that cooperation can emerge, and emerge, without the law. Maybe not as efficiently as is apparent with the law, however, emerge. There is a book, order without law, Robert Ellickson, which shows how neighbors settle disputes. It offers many examples. For example, what happens if a farmer's cow enters the land of another peasant settle the dispute through mutual agreements and custom. And there is no legal framework to resolve it. Maybe this is not enough for a complex economy, but it certainly shows that you can have some kind of cooperation without a legal structure. Second, you can have a legal structure that is not supported by the force. An example is the law of merchants ( Law Merchant) in the Middle Ages: a system of commercial law that was held in place by threats of boycott. Boycotting does not mean using force. It 's a peaceful act. Still, traders had stipulated that all these contracts, and, if not respect the contract, the court simply told everyone "this person has not complied with the contract, consider this if you do another contract with him." Third, it is entirely possible to have a formal legal system that is backed by the force but not a monopoly. As for Hobbes is not even this possibility in mind, do not even give any argument against it. But we can certainly find examples in history. The history of medieval Iceland, for example, where there was no central body of law enforcement. Although there was something that could perhaps be called the government had no executive branch. He had no police, no soldiers had had nothing. He had a kind of system of courts in competition with each other. But then, after the Court gives the verdict, did not bother applying. And the systems have evolved to perform this function automatically.
3. Locke: three "inconveniences" of anarchy
Of the most interesting topics are from Locke. He argues that anarchy has three "incidents". ... in any case was more optimistic than Hobbes. He thought that cooperation could emerge, based on moral inclinations on the one hand and self-interest on the other. Locke thought that there were three problems. One problem is that in an anarchist society there would be a general body of laws, generally known to all, and agreed by all, and understood by all. People can grasp some basic principles of natural law, but their application and the exact details were still controversial. Even among libertarians, there is no complete agreement on the details. So even in a society of peaceful libertarian who cooperate with each other, there will be disagreements on the details. So, if there is a general body of law that everyone knows in advance, and that everyone can rely in making decisions, then it can work. This was the first argument of Locke. There must be a universal legal body that applies to everyone and that everyone should know in advance. Second, there is a problem of law enforcement. He thought that without a unified government does not have enough power to enforce the law. We only have people who apply the law on their own, individuals who are too weak, not enough organized, and thus could be defeated by a gang of bandits or something. Third, Locke said that we can not trust the people when they are judges of themselves. If two people have a disagreement, and one says, "I know the natural law and enforce it with you", well, people tend to be biased and will find it plausible that interpretation of natural law that is more favorable if themselves. There you can trust people when they judge themselves, so they should be morally obliged to submit their disputes to an arbitrator. Maybe in an emergency can still defend themselves on the spot, but in other cases it is not a matter of immediate self-defense, it must delegate to an arbitrator, a third party. That is the rule. Locke thinks that these problems exist in anarchy, and that there would be with the government, or at least with the government right. But I think the opposite is true. I believe that anarchy will solve all three problems, and that the State, by its very nature, can not solve them. Let us examine first the question of universality, ie have a body of law universally known that people can know in advance and they can rely on. [Uniformity and predictability.] Now, one thing can stand out in a non-state system? As it happens, it's just that emerged with the Mercantile Law , precisely because the state does not provide such support. One of the things that made the emergence of mercantile law is that all European states had different laws regarding the merchants. They were all different. A court in France is not considered a valid contract made in England under the laws of England, and vice versa. And then, the merchants had trouble making international trade because there was no uniform system of commercial law throughout Europe. So the merchants got together and have said "well, facciamocela alone. The courts are out with all these different rules, and do not respect the decisions of one another, so let's ignore us, and we create our legal system." So this is a case in which the uniformity and predictability were produced by the market and not by the State. And you can see that this is not surprising. Those who have an interest in providing a private system to make it uniform and predictable, if this is what the customers need. This is for the same reason that you find on the market ATM triangular. As far as I know, there is no law that says you can not produce an ATM triangular. But if someone tries to put on the market, simply would not be popular because it does not fit the existing machines. When people need for diversity, when people need different systems for different people, the market provides just that. But there are cases where it is better uniformity. Your teller has more value for you if all the others use the same type or a type compatible, so you can use any provider anywhere you go, so the merchants if they want to make a profit, provide uniformity. So the market has incentive to provide uniformity, while the government does not necessarily have this incentive. Regarding the question of having sufficient force to organize and defend the rights of people ... Well, there is reason why you can not have anarchy with the organization. Anarchy does not mean that everyone makes shoes for themselves. The alternative to the government that gives the shoes is that not all of them make the shoes themselves. Similarly, the alternative to the government that provides legal services is not all take the law itself, or that everyone should be police officers themselves. There is no reason why people can not be organized in various ways. Indeed, if you're worried about the idea of \u200b\u200bnot having enough strength to resist an attacker, then a government monopoly is an aggressor more dangerous than any gang of bandits, he has that much power concentrated in one place in society. More interestingly, I think the argument about being judges themselves are directed against Locke. First of all, is not a good argument for the existence of a monopoly. In fact, the phrase "everyone should submit their disputes to a third party," is fallacious to deduce that "there should be a single third party to whom all submit their disputes." It is as if "everyone loves at least one TV program" we deducessimo "there is a TV show that is loved by everyone." Simply does not follow. You can have everyone submit their disputes to a third party without there being a third party to which all submit their disputes. Suppose there are three people on an island. A and B may submit their disputes to C, A and C may submit their disputes to B, B and C and may submit their disputes to A. So you do not need a monopoly to carry out the principle that persons should submit their disputes to a third party. But most of all: not only do not need a government but a government that is exactly what can not satisfy this principle. Because if you have a dispute with the government, the government does not control this dispute to a third party. If you have a dispute with the government, will be resolved in a court of the government (if you're lucky. If you are unlucky and you live in one of the most brutal governments, not even arrive in court). Now, of course, it is better if the government there is a separation of powers, so that there are more checks and balances, and so on. It's a bit 'better, because it is more similar to the situation where there are third parties. But anyway they are all parts of the same system: judges are paid with tax money and so on. In short, it is that you can have better and worse approximations of this principle with various types of government. However, until it is a monopoly, it is by its very nature, is in a sense no law. Not ultimately submit its dispute ever a third party.
4. Ayn Rand: private security agencies in their fight
This is probably the most popular argument against a libertarian society, supported by Ayn Rand. Take the following scenario: I believe that you have violated my rights, and you believe that it is not. I call my agency you call your security and protection agency. It so happens that the judges of their protection agencies do not agree on which of us is wrong. At this point, Rand asks, because the two agencies should not just fight? What guarantees do not fight? The answer of course is that nothing can guarantee that will not fight. Humans have free will. They can do whatever madness. They could fight. Similarly, George Bush might decide tomorrow to press the button for the nuclear bomb. People can do all sorts of things. But the question is: what is more likely? Who is more likely to resolve their disputes through violence: a government agency or private security? Well, the difference is that private security agencies must bear the costs of their decisions to go to war. Going to war is expensive. If you have to choose between being a customer of two security agencies, and one of the two resolves its disputes with violence, most of the time, and the other resolves its disputes by arbitration, most of the time, what you choose ? Sure you might think: "I want one that resolves disputes with violence. It 'pretty cool. "Ok, but will cost more. The question is how fanatic are you? Sure, you could be so fanatic who agreed to pay a higher fee. But many customers say" I do not choose that agency is charging extra money for the violence. "This in the anarchist society. Instead, the" clients "of the governments are forced to be guests of those governments, can not go somewhere else. are taxed anyway. So, if a government decides to go to war, should not fear that his clients to another agency to pass protection. So the governments and citizens can download the cost of war far more effectively than they do protection agencies ..
5. Robert Bidinotto: There is no final arbiter in disputes common objection - it is found, for example, Robert Bidinotto, who is a Rand wrote many articles against anarchy - (He and I have a kind of online debate in progress on this) - and whose main objection is that the anarchy in anarchy, there is no final arbiter in disputes. Under the rule, a few final arbiter at some point come to resolve disputes in one way or another. Well, in anarchy, as there is no agency that has the right defining things once and for all, there is no final arbiter, so disputes, in a sense, never end and are never resolved, always remain open.
So what's the answer to that? Well, I think there is an ambiguity about the concept of final arbiter. The "final arbiter" could be understood as the final arbiter in Platonic terms. In other words, something or someone or some institution that somehow guarantee absolutely that the dispute is closed forever, which guarantees absolute resolution. Or, for "final arbiter" can simply mean any person or institution or process or something else more or less reliable guarantees most of the time that these problems are solved.
It is true that in the Platonic sense of an 'absolute guarantee of a final arbiter - in that sense, anarchy does not produce at all. But it does not any other system. We take the constitutional republic MiniArc type that enjoys the favors of Bidinotto. There is a final arbiter in this system, in the sense of someone who absolutely guarantee the end of the process of dispute for ever? Well, I'll sue you, or I am being sued, or are accused of something - are in some kind of situation by the court. I lose. I call. I appeal to the Supreme Court. I go against. I urge the Congress to change the laws so that I favor. They do not. So I try to make a move for a Constitutional Emandamento. That fails, so I try to put all the new people for you to vote in Congress someone who votes in favor. In a way, I can go on forever. The dispute is not over. Yet, as a matter of fact, most of the lawsuits actually ends. Some people find it too costly to continue fighting. Similarly, in anarchy - of course there is no one can guarantee that the conflict will not go on forever. There are few guarantees that armor fits like a glove. But there are reasons not to expect it to work.
6. property rights can not emerge from the market
Another popular topic, often used by followers of Ayn Rand, is that market exchanges presuppose the existence of a property right. You and I can not exchange goods and services, and services or money, or anything like that, if there is already leaving a stable property rights that assure us of what we owned. As the market in order to function, requires a pre-existing property right, then the property right can not be the same product market. The right to property must emerge somehow, they do not know from where, but the market can not emerge (perhaps thinking that emerges from some infallible robot or something). In short, they work that way: at some point there is that property rights and market transactions are not happening, everyone is waiting for the entire legal structure is standing. And then, when the structure is complete, we can finally begin to make exchanges. It is certainly true that you can not have markets operating without a functioning legal system. But is not that the legal system is built first, and then, on the last day, when you finally finished putting together the legal system, people begin to make exchanges. These things evolve together. The legal and economic institutions created in parallel, in the same place at the same time. The legal system is not something independent of the activities it regulates. After all, the legal system, I repeat, not a robot or a god or something separate from us. The existence of a legal system consists of people who obey . If everyone ignored the legal system, it would have no power. So if the system survives, it is only because people generally respect him. Even then the legal system depends on voluntary support. I think one reason why many people are afraid of anarchy is that under a government think there is a kind of guarantee, which is lost in anarchy. That somehow there is a solid background that we can always cling to the worst case, a structure that does not exist in anarchy instead. But this robust bottom line is merely the product of people interacting on the basis of the incentives. Yet, when the anarchists say that people in anarchy would probably have incentives to do this or that, other people respond, "But not enough! I do not want is only likely to have incentives to do this. I want the government to ensure absolutely that will do it! " . But the government is made up of people. And depending on which is the constitutional structure of government, these people are likely to do one thing or another. You can not create a constitution that guarantees that people in the government behave in a precise way. You can create a constitution in such a way that are more likely to do so and less likely to do that. Anarchy is just an extension of the concept of "checks and balances" is a system that provides more checks and balances between the powers in relation to a constitution. For example, people say, "What ensures that the various agencies to resolve things in a certain way?" Well, the U.S. Constitution says nothing about what happens when different branches of government are in disagreement on how to fix things. It does not say what happens if the Supreme Court thinks that something is unconstitutional and the Parliament thinks it is not, and wants to proceed anyway. For example it is well known that the constitution does not say what happens if there is a dispute between states and the federal government. It is not always existed the current system, in which the Supreme Court stated that if something is unconstitutional, then the Parliament and the president no longer seek to do (or try to do less). Remember, when Andrew Jackson was president: the Supreme Court declared that what Jackson was trying to do was unconstitutional. He only replied, "Well, they made their decision, let's see if they can apply it." The constitution does not say if what Jackson did was the right thing. The solution that we follow Today is the one that emerged from the habit. Perhaps you are in favor, maybe you are against, but in any case, this solution has never been codified in law.
7. Organized crime takes control
One objection is that under anarchy organized crime take over. Well, anything can be. But is it probable? Organized crime gets its power because he specializes in things that are illegal things like drugs, prostitution and so on. During the years when alcohol was banned, he specialized in organized crime trafficking in alcohol. Today, not so much interested in the sale of alcohol. So the power of organized crime depends largely on government power. It 'a kind of parasite that lives of the assets of the government. The government creates markets by prohibiting certain things blacks. ... Organized crime specializes in this. So I think that organized crime would be weaker, not stronger, in a libertarian (1).
8. The rich will command If you become the legal systems in an economic good, justice is not simply line up the side of those who offer more? ... But under what system the rich are more powerful? Under the current system or under the anarchy of the market? Of course, if you are rich in both systems have many advantages. It's nice to be rich. You're always in a better position to bribe the people with bribes. But under the current system, the power of the rich has mushroomed. Suppose that I am a rich person is evil, and who seeks to persuade the government to do something that costs the country a million dollars. Do I have to bribe some bureaucrat with a bribe of one million dollars? No. Because I'm not asking the bureaucrat to do that thing with his money. Of course, if asked to do the same with his money, and wanted to get him to lose a million, I could not offer a bribe of less than one million. I should offer at least a million and a penny. But the bureaucrats administering the people's money, money taxes, which are not owned by them. ... Then all you gotta do is give a bribe to the bureaucrat small, say a thousand dollars, and he will direct these millions of tax dollars of taxpayers towards my favorite project. So the corruptive power of my money is multiplied. Instead, if you had a private security agency, and I tried to make you do something that costs a million, I should give a bribe of more than one million. So the power of the rich is actually fell under the anarchy of the market. And of course, any court of private justice that did the reputation of discriminating in favor of the millionaires against the poor would presumably also the reputation of discriminating in favor of the millionaires against billionaires. So the millionaires would not always have to deal with this agency. They would like to do with it only when they are dealing with people poorer, not richer. In short, the effects of such behavior on the reputation would not be too popular (2). For those concerned about the poor victims who can not afford legal services ... you can do what they did in Iceland medieval if someone hurt, you get a title that gives you the right to collect by force some compensation from that person. If you are too poor to pay for an agency that levies this material damages, you can still sell this title (or part of Title) to someone else. It 's like when we hire a lawyer with the method of payment "contingency fee" means a promise of the gains in case of victory [that is, in fact we sell a part of the lawyer entitled to compensation, NDM]. I mean, can you poor sell the right to compensation to someone who is in a position to collect that money and apply the law.
9. Robert Bidinotto: the masses will want to read bad
Another concern Bidinotto (which in some ways is the exact opposite of the concern that the rich will rule) is this:
"As Mises says, the market is like a big democracy, where is the sovereignty of consumers, and the mass gets whatever he wants (3). This is a beautiful thing when it comes to refrigerators and cars and things like that. But definitely not a good thing when it comes to laws. Because after all the masses are a bunch of intolerant, ignorant, if they can get any law they want, who knows what horrible things can be done. "But there is a difference between Mises's economic democracy and political democracy: democracy in the economic, it is true that people get what they want, but now must pay for it. Now, it is perfectly true that if certain people are pretty fanatical and they want to impose on others of the strongly perverse things, and if you have a group of people large enough and sufficiently fanatic who wants to do that, then anarchy would not lead to a result libertarian. In California, we have enough people who are fanatical about completely ban smoking. In Alabama, want to ban homosexuality instead of smoking. (And neither would ban the other, I think) ... In this case it might actually happen that, in economic democracy, people are so fanatical as to prohibit the thing in question. But remember they have to pay for it. So, when you come home later this month to pay the bill, it will say this: "Here is the amount to be paid for the basic service (to protect you from aggression). Oh, and then of course there is the additional fee for that other little thing (look into your neighbor's window to make sure there is smoking tobacco, or practice homosexuality, or anything else). At this point, people really fanatic will say "Yes, I'm fine with paying extra money for this service." But if I'm not so fanatical, they will say "Well, if all I have to do is to enter a voting booth and vote for these laws which restrict freedom of others, then I do it willingly go to vote will not cost me anything." But if they really pay for these laws, they will say "Er, perhaps, after all, can I turn a blind eye ... Maybe I can make my cabbages." (In addition, if people are so fanatical, even the so-called "minimal state" resolves the problem. So supporters of the "minimal state" (or minarchici) are not on more solid ground.).
10. Tyler Cowen and Robert Nozick: the protection agencies will become a de facto government
This question was originally raised by the philosopher Robert Nozick, and was further elaborated by economist Tyler Cowen. Nozick said, suppose that there is anarchy. [You and I have a dispute, and we are customers of two different agencies. The judges of the respective agencies are in disagreement about which of us is right.] In this case, it will happen one of two things: either the protection agencies will fight (but we already discussed this possibility) or is agreement in advance of arbitration agreements mortgages (4). What happens in the latter case, in which the agencies agree in advance to resolve their disputes through mutual agreements for arbitration? Well, in this case, according to Nozick, the agencies in question become a government. And he would return again to the State (5). Cowen then pushes this argument further. He says that what happens is that the agencies, making such agreements, create a cartel, and will serve the interest of this cartel transformed itself into a government. If you are a new agency to compete with the cartel, the cartel can simply boycott it. Just like, if you produce a new ATM is in your interest that this ATM is compatible with existing machines, so if you fund a new agency security is in your interest to become part of the system of arbitration agreements that are already observed by the existing agencies. Customers will not be if you discover that you did not close any agreement with other agencies about what should happen if one day you find yourself in conflict with these other agencies. But in this case, the cartel will be able to keep any new agency out of business simply by refusing to make deals with it (boycott). (6)
could happen such a thing? Sure. It may also happen that half the people of the United States kill themselves en masse tomorrow. But the question is, it is likely that the cartel is able to abuse its power in this way? The problem is that cartels are unstable for the usual reasons. This does not mean that it is impossible for a cartel to be successful. After all people have free will. But it is unlikely, because the same incentives that lead to form a cartel to bring you even try to cheat him - because he is always in the interest of anyone inside to sign the agreements with those who are fuori.L 'economist Bryan Caplan distinguishes between self-feeding and boycotts boycotts non-self-feeding. Boycotts self-feeding are those where the boycott is stable because it is a boycott, for example, a businessman who cheats his business partners. Now, it is clear that you should not have a moral will of iron to avoid doing business with people who cheat business partners. Do you have personal interests not to do business with these people. But think of the decision to forego a profitable exchange with someone because you do not like his religion or something, or because he is a member agency of protection that you do not like, or because the other members of the cartel to boycott you said they did not deal with him. Well, this boycott will work. Perhaps enough people (and perhaps all) in the cartel are so determined to keep alive the sign, and simply decide not to have sex with that person. Is it possible? Yes, but if we assume that they have formed a cartel to boycott personal economic interest, then the personal economic interest is exactly what will lead to its destruction, because it is in the interest of each individual member of the cartel have sex with that person.
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notes M. Colucci:
1) Is there an objection to such an agency that says security will be transformed into a criminal and take control. Agency protection sooner or later will be more successful than others, and become larger and more powerful than the others. At that point will become a convenient agency outlawed, that is, wipe out the other agencies, and begin to require compulsory payments from people. In this way, the agency in question will become in effect a Stato.Una answer to this objection is as follows: there is empirical evidence that the market for security services there is a "natural monopoly
. That is, the smaller agencies are more efficient than large ones. So in a market system, agencies would do little more money than the big ones. So the agencies would remain relatively small. So do not never reach the critical size which would make them affordable to become outlaws.
2) In a libertarian society, agencies arbitration would live entirely on our reputation, if an agency to issue a ruling that could be perceived as unfair by the people, that agency would lose many customers, probably ending up bankrupt. So, to bribe a private agency, you should offer more than its market value. This is a figure much higher than that which you offer to bribe a judge today. So the agencies should be more impartial and more difficult to corrupt than the current judges. If ever such thing as fairness or impartiality, private agencies will get closer to this concept as much as possible.
3) Then the anarchy of the market could also be called "market democracy".
4) That is, two by two agencies conclude a contract that says "If in the future we will find you and I disagree, Tom delegate agency to decide which of us is right." Attention: Tom is not always the same agency: each pair of different agencies may choose an agency as a referee.
5) In this thesis, among others Nozick replied Murray Rothbard and David Friedman. The answer is that these agencies would not be a real government, because (1) does not forced payments to claim: the citizen is free to not pay and do not use their services, and (2) the citizen would be free to found competing agencies.
of RD Long 
2. Hobbes: the government is necessary for cooperation 
3. Locke: three "inconveniences" of anarchy 
4. Ayn Rand: private security agencies in their fight 
5. Robert Bidinotto: There is no final arbiter in disputes 
6. property rights can not emerge from the market 
7. Organized crime takes control 
8. The rich will command 
9. Robert Bidinotto: the masses will want to read bad 
10. Tyler Cowen and Robert Nozick: the protection agencies will become a de facto government 
